Since then, the world began to poke a finger in Beijing for the spread of the coronavirus, Pakistan went out of his way to Express solidarity with China. Even to the extent of refusing to allow its 1,000-odd students stranded in Wuhan, in the epicentre of the outbreak, to return to Islamabad in February. It is no secret that Beijing has been receiving support from all his friends, or clients, as some analysts describe relations between China and Pakistan. Islamabad, the debt to China for more than one reason, have gone a step further. China was defeated countries, particularly the United States, and was widely considered to be gross negligence Beijing, which led to the spread of the disease, which has infected 11 million people worldwide and killed about 530,000.
In the cacophony that followed, as countries took part, Pakistan has, of course, the loudest voice in support of China despite some concerns in foreign policy circles in Islamabad.
Before the world was able to see the consequences of a pandemic, Pakistan was in a comfortable position on the foreign policy front, particularly in the Chinese-American matrix. It was effectively using its influence on the Taliban to extract concessions from the US in the global financing of terrorism Watchdog task force on financial activities. Washington was soft-pedaling on the failure of Pakistan in accordance with the action plan of FATF and allowed him extra time in Paris plenary in February. Postponement, by any standards, was a fair indicator of the successful treatment of the Ministry of foreign Affairs of Pakistan to manage a difficult situation.
A big part of that the efforts of the Pakistani diplomats to focus on the sensitivity in Washington seemed to have come undone as the Pakistani service began to carry signals from Beijing, which wanted the government of Prime Minister Imran Khan to continue to back them up. Seasoned officials in the Ministry of foreign Affairs and some in the office of the Prime Minister, was the first to notice changes in the approach of Washington. Officials, including the US-educated special adviser on national security Moeed Yusuf and the UK-education Zulfi Bukhari, realized the impossibility of balancing relations with Washington and Beijing in the face of inflexible institutions, and decades of thinking is characterized by mistrust of the West.
Pakistani military of bigotry and the stranglehold over key foreign policy issues has prevented the country could benefit from existing experience at home and develops a pragmatic and non-confrontational foreign policy. At a time when world public opinion sharply against Beijing, Pakistan decided to play the devil’s advocate.
For example, when foreign Minister Shah Mahmood Qureshi made a statement on a telephone conversation with his Chinese counterpart Wang and the Ministry of foreign Affairs, to mark, to highlight Pakistan’s commitment to the “one China policy” and to Express support to China on its “vital interests, including Hong Kong, Taiwan, Tibet and Xinjiang”.
In Pakistan, the army was in a key position, regardless of the mode of power. It may also have nothing to lose if Pakistan again together with such as North Korea. In fact, it was argued that criticism of his influence of the army in politics and civic life seeks increased proportionally with the isolation of Pakistan, as well as access to material goods for his leadership.
The army was the largest beneficiary of the billions that the US has invested in Pakistan in the name of support for the war on terror.
When it seemed dried out, he found a donor in Beijing, for whom a China-Pakistan economic corridor has become a flagship project for its ambitious belt and one road initiative. It can also lead Pakistan into a debt trap.
Thousands of Pakistanis have paid with their lives for a short-sighted strategy of creation of arms and cultivation of terrorists and transformation of terror into an instrument of foreign policy.
What troubles a new strategy for milk China and CPEC will lead to the Pakistanis, only time will tell. More erudite officials of the foreign office can visualize the consequences for Pakistan, such as the increased likelihood of its completion in the FATF blacklist, if it does not perform its action plan.